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Regional integration arrangements  are more likely te be a
stepping stone toward a freer world trading system if GATT
rules are strengthened  - and if developing  countries  enter into
arrangements  with  developed  ratherthanotherdeveloping  coun-
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After lying dormant for two decades, regional  a preferential approach to trade liberalization
integration is on the rise. Recent initiatives  may not increase welfare.  For a small country,
suggest that the world trading system may be  unilateral trade liberalization will be superior to
moving toward three trading blocs clustered  a preferential approach unless the world divides
around Japan, the European Community, and the  into trading blocs with mutually high barriers-
Ulnited  States.  in which case, a preferential approach ensures
Some view this development as a move  market access.
toward a less fragmented world trading system;  In a discussion of the welfare cconomics of
others, as a threat to multilateralism.  For a  trading blocs, they note that the move to a few
typical developing country, the issue is whether  trading blocs may make a cooperative solution
to enter into a regional integration arrangement  more likely - at the same time increasing the
or to choose unilateral trade liberalization.  rewards of noncooperative behavior if bargain-
Two questions must be asked: Is a preferen-  ing fails.
tial appreach likely to enhance economic effi-  With an empirical evaluation, De Melo,
ciency?  And are substantial benefits attainable  Montenegro, and Panagariya show that - after
more easily through regionalism or through  controUling  for differences in investment -
unilateral trade liberalization?  countries that integrated grew no faster than their
De Melo, Montenegro, and Panagariya  comparator group.  But human capital contrib-
address these issues first by reviewing past and  utes significantly to growth, suggesting benefits
recent regional integration arrangements.  They  from regional integration arrangements that
note that recent arrangements are occurring in a  emphasize cooperation.
more liberal trading environment than those in  And there is evidence of catch-up, suggest-
the past, and that developing countries are now  ing benefits for the least-developed members of
seeking integration with developed country  the new wave of  arrangements that emphasize
partners (for example, Mexico with the United  North-South membership.
States).  So the context is different from past  In short, regional integration arrangements
arrangements, when regional integration was  are more likelv to be a stepping stone toward a
viewed as an extension of import-substitution  freer world trading system if GAT  rules are
industrialization at the regional level.  strengthened, and if developing countries enter
In a discussion of the welfare economics of  into arrangements with developed rather than
preferential trading arrangements, they show that  other developing countries.
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Regional integration  (RI) is on the roll again.  Powered by the perceived success of the EC,
disappointment  with the Uruguay  round under the GATT, and by the U.S. enthusiasm  for free trade
areas (FTAs), regionalism  is flourishing  around the world.  Is regionalism  here to stay this time or
likely to subside as in the sixties? Is this new regionalism  similar to previous one in terms of
objectives  and characteristics? Is it likely to raise world welfare? And is it likely to lead to a
fragmentation  of the world trading system into inward-looking  blocs or is it likely to facilitate  the-
process of multilateral  trade negotiation? This paper attempts  to address these questions.
Interest in bilateral or plurilateral approaches  to trade policy is not new.  The move towards
an open trade regime in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth  century was led by a series of
bilateral treaties that started with the Anglo-French  accord of 1860. An important  element of that
accord was the inclusion  of an unconditional  Most-Favored-Nation  (MFN) clause which, not only
eliminated  the need for renegotiation  in the event that either country lowered tariffs with third
countries, but also preserved equal access of both countries in each other's markets.  In implementing
the treaty, Britain extended its own tariff reductions  to other countries while France adopted a two-
tier tariff structure, lowering  tariffs only on British goods. Much as the stampede  that followed  the
recent initiative  for a free trade area (FTA) between  the U.S. and its neighbors, other European
countries  rushed to seek agreements  with France to secure access for their own goods in the French
market.
More recent history has also witnessed  spurts in regionalism. In the post WWII period,
during the fifties, at the same time that trade liberalization  was negotiated  multilaterally,  regionalism
led by European arrangements  spread across Latin America, Africa, and the Middle  East.  Afterlaying dormant throughout  the seventies, it made a comeback  in the eighties. The process has heated
up in the early nineties with new initiatives  almost every month.'
The recent initiatives at RI suggest  that the world trading system may be getting divided into
three trading blocs built around the EC, the U.S., and Japan (the "triad").  To some, this
development  is a move towards a less fragmented  world trading system, while to others, it is a threat
to multilateralism. In this latter view, regionalism  distracts negotiators and politicians from the
difficult  task of reaching agreement in the GATT negotiations,  and serves as a substitute rather than a
complement  to multilateralism.
In evaluating  this new wave of regionalism,  one must first recognize  that conditions  are
different  today from those during the regionalism  of the sixties.  Not only is world trade substantially
freer now than then, but also there is a very different perception, at least among the developing
countries  that are engaging  in-RI.  Then, the goal of the G-77 was import-substitution  industrialization
(ISI)  by closing their markets to developed-country  exports.  Today, most developing countries  are
independently  engaging  in substantial  unilateral trade liberalization  (UTL), and often applying
simultaneously  for GATT membership. This time around, developing  countries are seeking  to
associate with large developed-country  partners to insure market access. As a consequence,  today's
RI has a different face.  In some cases, it is of the North-South  variety rather than of the North-North
and South-South  variety which were the predominant  arrangements  of the first wave of RI.
The main post WWII RI arrangements,  old and new, are introduced  in section  II.  Our
discussion  there shows that, of the first wave of RI, only European integration  - which took place
against  a backdrop  of significant  multilateral  trade liberalization  - was "successful". By contrast, RI
I  In 1992  alone, ASEAN was revived with the goal of reaching FTA status and, independently
of their application  for EC membership,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary and Poland engaged talks to form
an FTA.
2among developing  countries was a failure, both in terms of implementation,  and in terms of the stated
objectives  of accelerating  the pace of industrialization  by raising intra-regional  trade.  -
Building  on the description of RI schemes  in section II, sections  III and IV deal with the
welfare economics  of RI.  The question  to be answered is whether RI will lead to improved  welfare
(i) taking the rest of the world as given and (ii) assuming  that the rest of the world, too, will engage
in regionalism  and be divided into trading blocs.  We address in section III, the first issue in terms of
a discussion  of the classic Vinerian terminology  of trade diversion and trade creation. The discussion
of the second issue, in section IV, is more speculative  since  just about any outcome is possible
depending  on the strategic interactions  among  actors.  Because it is so important,  however, we discuss
the potential gains and losses that are likely to be faced under different assumptions  about trading
blocs.
The discussion  in section V turns to a broad evaluation  or RI arrangements. After comparing
indices of openness  before and after integration, we ask whether  performance, broadly measured in
terms of growth, was higher in groups of countries  that integrated  than among comparator  control
group countries  that did not.  We ask three questions: did countries  that integrate  grow noticeably
faster? Was any difference  in growth attributable  to differences in investment?  And third, controlling
for differences  in investment,  was there still any significant  difference in growth?
To anticipate  our main conclusions,  we argue that one must judge the new wave of
regionalism  with caution.  First, insofar as there is a renewal of interest in RI among developing
countries, as there is presently in parts of Latin America (e.g. the Mercosur) and throughout  parts of
Africa and Asia, there is likely to be at most few benefits, and perhaps high costs unless these
arrangements  are accompanied  by substantial  UTL.  Second, for the  arrangements  that involve
developing  countries  - including  the former East European  countries  - associating  with large
developed-country  members, there are likely to be other benefits that are often overlooked in the
3narrow economic  assessments. These include catch-up, partly cooperation  leading to greater
technological  transfer and the more rapid development  of human  capital.  There should also be
benefits coming  from an increase in the confidence  that macroeconomic  policies wiil be more
reasonable in the less-developed  member, and that the reforms undertaken to reach an agreement  or to
accede  to membership  will stick. 2 Third, the recent initiatives among  developed countries have
addressed issues that have not been dealt with effectively  within  the multilateral  process of the GATT
(e.g. government procurement  policies, standards  and competition  policies, etc.).  Fourth, there is a
real danger, however, that blocs might become inward rather than outward-looking,  which would be
very costly for the developing  countries  that do not belong  to one of the blocs as they would, in
effect, be  denied market access. This fear goes a long way in explaining  the recent moves among
developing  countries in trying to ensure market access in the markets of their developed-country
partners.  v
II.  A Synopsis  of Regional  Integration Schemes
Tables 1 and 2 respectively,  describe the first and second waves of RI arrangements  for those
that ultimately  led to a share of intra-regional  exports in tota! exports in excess of four percent of total
exports.  A host of African schemes  that were signed but eventually  led to no significant  trade are not
reported. 3 For each scheme, we list year of foundation, and number of members.  Also, next to the
2  Institutional  aspects of RI are developed at greater length in de Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik
(forthcoming).
3  The criterion is arbitrary and omits some schemes  whose goals were cooperation  rather than
establishing  an FTA or a Customs  Union (CU) (e.g. the Indian Ocean Commission)  and a few others,
mostly in Africa, that were not natural trading partners and never gained any momentum  in intra-
regional trade (e.g. the Communaute  Economique  des Pays des Grands Lacs, the Mano River Union).
4name, we report a few useful characteristics:  combined  GDP (in 1985 dollars); total population  and  a
measure of income disparity among  members. 4 The column "comments"  gives broad targets,
instruments, achievements,  and difficulties. 5
Table I highlights a sharp contrast ill implementation  record between Nonth-North  RI schenes
on the one hand, and South-South  schemes,  on the other.  Implementation  was by and large successful
for developed-country  RI arrangements  (although  it could  be argued that the goal of a common
market reflected in the 1957  Treaty of Rome is yet to be reached). By contrast, by and large,
implementation  was unsuccessful  for developing-country  RI schedules. Several implementation
difficulties  are noted in the "comments"  column. First, reductions  of trade barriers among members
was often postponed or delayed because the  .rocess  lacked automaticity  ("positive" lists, restrictive
rules of origin for the coverage of products eligible for p-eferential  tariffs, etc.).  And, in the cases
where implementation  was fairly successful (e.g. the CACM), macroeconomic  difficulties  in the
eighties  led to the imposition  of QRs.  Second, when the establishment  of a CU was the target,
implementation  of a Common  External Tariff (CET) was often difficult  to achieve in part because
I  Whenever members leave/join, latest membership  is indicated [e.g. EC (12), EFTA (7)].  All
figures in this table, and in the rest of the paper, are from Heston and Summers (1991).
5  "Natural  trading partners", an indication  that members are likely to have benefitted (compared
with the ex-ante status quo) is only mentioned  when members have highly integrated  transport
networks  and similar production structures thereby giving scope for the expansion  (contraction)  of
relatively  efficient (inefficient)  industries. On why SSA countries  are not "natural trading partners"
see Stolper and Deardorff (1991). They argue that much smuggling  and unrecorded  trade takes place
among  SSA countries because countries  and borders are organized along North-South  routes while
natural routes to minimize  transport costs are organized along East-West lines.  Under such
circumstances,  they show that unrecorded  trade is likely to be welfare increasing. Also, there is no
mention is made of "trade-creation"  or "trade-diversion"  effects unless these are widely recognized  to
be significant, and there is general agreement  as to their direction. For example, there is no entry for
the CACM or for the Canada-U.S. FTA in spite of numerous studies.  This is because  of indecisive
(and/or controversial)  findings. [See Whalley  (forthcoming)  table  for a comparison  of the results of
the welfare estimates  of the Canada- U.S. FTA, and Langhammer  and Hiemmenz  (1991) tables 4 and
5 for a survey of the results of estimates  of trade creation  and trade diversion and of the training
ground argument for developing countries.]
5Table 1:  First Wave Regional Integration Arrangements
Namne  Acronym  Conmnents:  (approach, (Population,  YPC, GDP, sdv) _l  (Year of foundation;  achievements, delays)
number  of members)  Emphasis
Africa
Communautl Economique  de  CEAO  FTA  Members  belong to the Westem  African donetary  Union L'Afrique de L'ouest  [1972, (1974); 71  (WAMU)  and to ECOWAS. Community  Development  Fund (32.0; 916; 29.3; 34530)  to compensate  members  for loss of tariff revenue. For
compensation  reasons, the structure  was tailored  to
accommodate  higher  protection  for the least developed.
Economic  Community  of West  ECOWAS  FTA  Most  ambitious  (full economic  integration  within 15 years). African  States  (1975; 16)  Little  progress in libetalizing  trade (fear of large (130.8; 1260; 164.7; 37655)  revenue  losses and higb.  transitional  costs from restructuring
insufficiently compeasated  by access  to the Community's
fund).  Progress also retarded  by QRs.  Legal  and institu-
tional  weakness  and controversial  rules of otigin (by
ownership  structure rather than valueadded).
Customs  and Economic  Union of  UDEAC  CU  Treaty called for a CU but CET was abandoned  de Central Africa  11973  (6)1  facto.  Inta-union trade in manufactures
(14.7; 1071; 15.7; 32947)  restricted  to those produced  by firms  enjoy-
ing the status of the Taxe Unique System.
South Aftican Customs Union  SACU  CU  Includes  South Africa.  In existence  since 1910. Goods (24.0; 3883; 9.3; 2148.6)  (1969; 4)  and factor madce$ well idegrated.  CET operational.
South African  Development  SADCC  Coordination  and  To reduce  economic  dependence  on South  Africa  through Coordination  Conference  (1980; 10)  Cooperation  cooperation  on projects  to foster balanced  regional (60.0; 924; 55.4; 34147)  development. Successfil  in mobilizing  donor support
and in implementing  transport  and communications
projects.  New emphasis  on investment  in production.
6Table 1:  First Wave Regional Integration Arrangenents  (continued)
Name  Acronym  Emphasis  Comments: (approach, (Population,  YPC, GDP, sdv) al  (Year of foundation;  achievnents,  delays)
number  of members)
Asia
Association  of South East Asian Nations  ASEAN  FTA  Initial  ebjective to promote regional  peace  and stability (189.4; 1027; 194.4; 102305)  (1967; 5)  and cooperation  and accelerate  growth through cooperation  via
implementation  of industrial  projects  and a FTA.
Minimal intra-trade  liberalization  and little
coordination  of industrial  projects.  Effective  in promoting
political  stability  and diffusing  territorial  and ethno-
political  disputes.
Europe
Tbe European Communities  EC  CM  All tariffs  and QRs on intra-EC trade eliirinated by 1968. (160.1; 3556; 569.3; 90446)  (1952, 12 as of 1986)  CAP very restrictive.
European  Free Trade Association  (1960; 7 as of 1991)  FTA  Elimination  of all tariffs  on manufactures  by 1967.  More (27.9; 6106; 170.3; 145812)  highly integrated  with EC (5O%  of EFTA total trade; intra-
trade share  of 25%) than among themse!ves.
Special rules for agricultural  trade. Latin America
Andean  Subregional  Integration  Agreement  Andean Pact (AP)  CU and industrial  Grew out dissatisfaction  of unevenly  distributed  gains (57.2; 3014; 172.4; 118915)  (1969; 5 since 1976)  planning  under LAFTA. Until  recently  (1990), philosophy  of self- reliance  based on [SI with priority of industrial  planning  over
trade liberalization. Implementation  of a MCET (1980)  was
delayed. Discouragement  of FDI in 1971.
Central American  Common  Market  CACM  CU and industrial  Goal to promote ISI.  Included  regional  payments  system. (11.2; 1519; 17.0; 19658)  (1960; 5)  planning  Barriers to intra-regional  trade lifted by 1971  with high CET
(106% tariff on consumer  goods; 36% intermediates;  11%
capital  goods). CET not in effect for all partners. Industrial
planning  failed. Fiscal  problems due to revenue  loss.  With
onset of macro  difficulties,  introduction  of QRs in 1980s.
7Table 1:  First Wave Regional Integration Arrangements (continued)
Name  Acronym  Emphasis  Coamnents:  (approach, (Population,  YPC, GDP, sdv) aL  (Year  of foundation;  achievemnls,  delays)
number  of members)
Caribbean  Community  CARICOM  CU  In practice, non-tariff  barriers  have often been used (3.4; 4472; 15.2; 64145)  (1973; 13 since 1983)  against intra-regional  trade and imports  to differeni
countries  are subject  to different  tax rates
(including  tariffs, surcharges,  and stamp duties).
Recent  attempt  to increase  compliance  with tbe CET.
Latin American Integration  Association  LAFTA/LAIA  FTA  Liberalization  by positive  lists (national  lists, common  lists). (184.4; 2213; 408.1; 118915)  (I  960)/(1980)(;  11  )  Weighted  average  preferential  tariff margin on intra-regional
trade reached  22% by 1969.  Intra-regional  trade expanded
mostly for manufactures  (see Erza  and Yeats, 1992).
Source: de la lorre  and Kelly (1992), Nogues  and Quintanilla  (forthcoming),  Foroutan  (forthcoming),  and authors' comments.
Notes:  Figures  in brackets next to year of foundation  indicate  the year the arrangement  went into effect.  All income figures  are in $1985. at the time the economic  unit was in effect.
Abbreviations:
FTA =  Free Trade Area; CU = customs  union; CM = comnon market.  SI = import  substitution  industrialization;  MCET =  ninimum  common  external  tariff (CET).
FDI  =  Foreign direct investment;  CAP = conmon agricultural  policy;
EEA =  Furopean Economic  Area.
aI  Population  in millions;  income per capita (YPC) in $ 1985;  GDP in $ billion, 1985;  SDV =  standard  deviation  of income  per capita.
8members  often sought exemptions  from external tariffs (e.g., for "necessary"  imports from outside
the region). Third, industrial planning  failed, as satisfactory  mechanisms  to determine "equitable"
allocations  of industries  across members could not be devised (at most a handful of firms/projects
qualifiled  in the ASEAN, CACM, and LAFTA schemes). Finally, efforts at allowing freer intra-union
factor mobility (ECOWAS,  CEAO, GCC) were only partially implemented.
Perhaps the most important  cause of failure was the difficulty  in devising satisfactory
compensation  schemes  for losers.  While the political economy  of compensation  always makes it
difficult  to settle upon satisfactory schemes  to all partners, especially  when negotiation  takes place
between countries, the need to deal with compensation  was far more pronounced  among developing
countries  than among  developed countries. This is because the need to relocate to new activities  was
*iot  so pronounced  among developed  countries as the increase in intra-regional  trade was mostly  the
result of an increase in intra-industry  trade whereas among  developing  countries, any increase in
intra-regional  trade would have tended to be of the inter-industry  type which requires more adjustment
assistance  for compensation. 6
The more recent arrangements  initiated in the eighties, and those under consideration  are shown
in table 2.  It is clear from the list of members  that there is generally  more diversity among members
than in the first wave of RI.  The comments  also suggest that the emphasis  has changed. First,
arrangements  among industrial countries  (ANZCERTA,  EC, EFTA, US-Canada  FTA) have gone
beyond trade liberalization  in goods that are the subjei.;t  of GATI negotiations  by including some
liberalization  in services and investment,technical  and regulatory standards (e.g. the pro-competition
policy to be implemented  under EC-1992), as well as customs formalities  and government
6  For a discussion  of some of the difficulties  in implementing  compensation  schemes in Africa,
see Foroutan (forthcoming).
9Tahle 2:  Second wave regionial  integration arrangements
Naine  Acronym  Emphasis  Comments: (approach,
(Population,  YPC, GDP, sdv)  /  (Year of foundation;  achievements, delays)
number of members)
Preferential  Trade Area for Eastern  PTA  FTA  Trade liberalization  by a positive  list with rules of origin
and Southern A;.ica  (1982  (1984); 181  combining  a local value added  criterion (not more than 60%
(180.0; 695; 125.1; 4205.8)  imported  inputs)  with local ownership  (over 50%). Time-
table of gradual  tariff reduction  started in 1988 with
zero tariffs by 2000.  Difficulties  due to macroeconomic
imbalances  and the equitable  distribution  of costs and benefits.
Australia-New  Zealand Closer Economic  ANZCERTA  FTA  '  Elimination  of all tariffs by 1988  and all QRs by
Relations  Trade Agreement  (1983; 2)  1995  with only a few agricultural  and industrial
(18.5; 11164;  206.5; 107086)  support  measures  to remain.  In 1988,  agreement
for liberalization  of trade in services  and
harmonization  of regulatory  practices.
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement  CUSTA  FTA  Average  protection  of I % at time of agreement. Removal  of
(271.9; 18141;  4932.4; 317528)  (1987)  all tariffs and most QRs within  one year period.  Rules  of
origin  to determine  eligibility  for duty-free  treatment.
Also includes  provisions  for reciprocal  opening of trade in
services,  government  procuremnent  and investment. No
harmonization  of regulatory  regimes. Many exceptions  (see
Whalley, forthcoming).
U.S. Israel Free Trade Arrangement  U.S. Israel  FTA  The agreement  calks  for the remnoval  of all tariffs and most
(243.5; 16649;  4053.9; 482798)  (1985;2)  other fonrs of protection  imposed  by both countries  on each
other's products  within 10 years. Implementation  began on
I September  1985  and is expected  to be completed  oan
I January 1995.
10Talile 2:  Second wave regional integration arrangements (cont'nued)
Naine  Acronym  Emphasis  Comments: (approach,
(Population,  YPC, GDP, sdv) a)  (Year of foundation;  achievements, delays)
number  of members)
Single  market program  EC  CM  Common  market  by January 1993. Single  nmaret  program still
(1992)  requires harmonization  of indirect  taxation,  free movement  of
people  and the treatment  of imports  of sensitive  sectors (e.g.
autos). Mutual  recognition  of national  standards  within  EC
could act as barrier to third countries  if they are not allowed
single-point  access  to the EC.
European  Econowic Area  EEA  . Extends  provisions  of 'EC 1992"  to EFTA. Single European
(1991)  Act (1987)  to eliminate  segmentation  caused  by regulatory
barriers  by 1993. Bilateral  FrAs with EC and signing of EEA
in 1991  leading  to adoption  of EC laws.
Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay  MERCOSUR MERCOSUR  CM
(1991)
Under Consideration kI
Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Poland, Israel  Membership
with EC
Eastern Europe  with EFTA  FTA
Canada-Mexico-US  NAFTA  FTA  Free trade area
Enterprise  for the Americas  Initiative  EAI  Hemispheric  FTA  As of October 1991,  framework  agreement  signed  with
29 countries.
a/  Population  in millions;  income  per capita in $ 1985;  GDP in $ billion, 1985; sdv = standard  deviation  of income  per capita.
bI  Partial list.  For a more  complete  list of recent iniliatives,  see de la Toffe and Kelly  (1992, tables I and 2).  For further description
of initiatives  in Latin America, see Nogues  and Quintanilla  (forthcoming).
11procurement  policies.  Second, the recently signed agreements  under the Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative (EAI) among Latin American countries  -- which can be seen as steps towards ahemispheric
FTA - are quite distinct from past arrangements  since they are outward- rather than inward-oriented.
These initiatives go beyond a  revival or extension  of existing  schemes as virtually all participants
have independently  carried out significant  UTL.'  Third, as mentioned  in the introduction,  more
often than not, partners in the new initiatives  are from the developed and the developing  world
leading to North-South  schemes  blocs rather than to the North-North and South-South  schemes
described in table 1.
Table 3 contrasts  general differences  in goals and approaches  to regional integration during
the first wave of RI.  In terms of goals, the least ambitious was Asian RI that emphasized
cooperation. Also in its approach, Asian RI emphasized  cooperation  and was more outward-oriented
than RI in Africa or Latin America. And in its approach  to trade policy implementation,  even though
it did not rely on multilateralism,  it was less discriminatory  towards non-members,  as it was
accompanied  by some UTL.
To conclude thi,; brief synopsis, we report in table 4 the evolution  of intra-regional  trade and
of a crude measure  of ope.nness  (the trade-to-GDP  ratio) for RI arrangements  with a share of intra-
regional exports above 4 percent.  The sample includes  four arrangements  among developed countries
(including  the recent Canada-U.S. FTA described  in table 2) and six developing-country
arrangements. The figures in parenthesis indicate  the evolution of each grouping's share in world
trade.  It is a rough measure of the grouping's influence  in world trade.  For obvious reasons stated
in section III below, even though one might be tempted  to do so, one should not interpret increases in
openness  or in world export share to imply net trade creation.
7  For a discussion  of the recent unilateral measures  towards trade liberalization  carried out by
Latin American countries, see Nogues and Quintanilla  (forthcoming).
12Table 3:  Main Characteristics of First Wave RI Schenes:  Arrica, Latin America, EEC, and East Asia
Main characteristics  Africa  Latin America  EEC, EFfA  Asia
Main objectives  balanedxl  developtnent  through  balanceAd  development  through  common  market  ease political  tensions  and
ISI  IsI  expansion  of international
foster  conditions  for  market  shares
equitable  sharing of net  equitable  sharing of net  European  political  union
benefits  benefits
Trade orientation  inward-oriented  inward-oriented  multilateral  liberalization  outward  oriented
Mechanism  negotiated  integration  negotiated  integration  negotiated  integration  market led integration
Approach to intra-regional  national  and common  lists of  national and common  lists of  sequencing  of across-the-board  unilateral  trade liberali-
trade liberalization  products to be liberalized  products to be liberalized  reduction  of trade impediments  zation
(FTAs except CACM)
industrial  targeting  harnonization  of national
industrial  targeting  rules for exceptions
Trade strategy  with  cooperation  and regional IS[  regional ISI  negotiated  liberalism  with  cooperation  (ASEAN)  and
nonmember  countries  common  extemal  lariff (EC)  market-oriented  liberalism
Treatment  of memnber  preferential  treatment  of  preferential  treatment  of  most-favored-nation  principle  non-preferential  treatment
countries  least developed  member  least developed  member
countries  countries
Institutional  framework  no supranational  entities  no supranational  entities  with supranational  entities  not applicable
(except  (with exception  of Andean  (EC)
Treaty and Clearing  House  in
Sources:  Authors' elaboration  from Foroutan  (forthcoming)  and Nogues  and Quintanilla  (forthcoming).
13Several observations  are suggested from the figures in table 4.  First, compared with
developing  countries, developed  countries that engaged in RI were "natural" partners at the time they
integrated. Of course these relatively high initial trade ratios (which form the base for the "triangle'
calkulations  illustrated  in figure 1) were high not only because of low transport costs but also because
of higher and less dispersed incomes. 8 Also, in the case of the EC, during the first decade when all
trade barriers to intra-regional  trade were eliminated  (by 1968), the sharp increase in intra-regional
trade was also accompanied  by a sharp increase in  openness. The only other scheme in table 3 with
a similar evolution in trade patterns during the first dec-  it was in effect, is the CACM.
Second, developed countries  experienced  a sustained  rise in intra-regional  trade and an
increase in openness  suggesting  that trade expansion  was due to both bilateral and multilateral
reductions  in trade barriers.  On the other hand, among  developing countries, when intra-regional
trade increased, the increase *as usually not sustained. This suggests  that little reduction in trade
barriers took place.  There was therefore some scope for changes  in trade patterns and these were not
completely  rigid.  It also suggests  that reductions  in trade barriers were often temporary, the typical
example  being the large decline in intra-regional  trade among  CACM countries  in the eighties when,
for balance-of-payments  purposes  during the debt crisis, QRs were reinstated. It is also significant  that
intra-regional  trade amnong  developing  countries in RI arrangements  was low when compared with
South-South  trade.  Excluding (including)  major oil exporters  and Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore  and
Taiwan, South-South  trade was 17% (34%) in 1988-90  which is higher than intra-regional  trade
among  all the groupings  in table 4 except ASEAN.
Third, among  developing  countries, only CACM and ASEAN experienced  increases in intra-
regional trade comparable  to those registered among developed-country  groupings. Also, ASEAN is
I  The positive relationship  between  openness  and income level is well-established. See, e.g.
Chenery  and Syrquin (1975).
14Table 4:  Regional  Integration Sclenies:  Openness  (OP)  aiid Inlra-Regional  %iR)  Exports
Founded'  1960  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 oPb  IR'  OP  IR  OP  IR  OP  IR  OP  IR  OP  IR
ANZCERTA  1983  30.3  5.7  27.8  6.1  26.4  6.2  32.1  6.4  33.0  7.0  29.7  7.6 (2.4)  (2.1)  (1.7)  (1.4)  (1.6)  (1.5)
EC  1957  31.3  34.5  41.0  51.0  48.0  50.0  55.0  54.0  51.7  54.5  46.5  60.4 (24.9)  (39.0)  (35.9)  (34.9)  (35.6)  (41.4)
EFrA  1960  37.3  21.1  39.9  28.0  48.3,  35.2  57.4  32.6  59.0  31.2  52.6  28.2 (14.9)  (14.9)  (6.3)  (6.1)  (6.3)  (6.8)
Canada-US-FrA  1989  8.8  26.5  10.7  32.8  16.1  30.6  20.8  26.5  17.4  38.0  19.5  34.0 (21.9)  (20.5)  (16.8)  (15.1)  (16.7)  (15.8)
ASEAN  1967  36.6  4.4  46.0  20.7  58.2  15.9  73.6  16.9  64.0  18.4  97.5  18.6 (2.6)  (2.1)  (2.6)  (3.7)  (3.9)  (4.3)
ANDEAN PACT  1969  37.2  0.7  30.6  2.0  40.5  3.7  40.3  3.8  29.4  3.4  32.5  4.6 (2.9)  (1.6)  (1.6)  (1.6)  (1.2)  (0-9)
CACM  1961  33.7  7.0  43.4  25.7  55.0  23.3  53.7  24.1  32.5  14.7  43 '  14.8 (0.4)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.1)
LAFTA/LAI  A  1960/80  21.0  7.9  17.7  9.9  20.8  13.6  21.9  13.7  22.1  8.3  19.4  10.6 (6.0)  (4.4)  (3.5)  (4.2)  (4.7)  (3.4)
ECOWAS  1975  n.a.  n.a.  37.4  3.0  42.3  4.2  44.4  3.5  32.2  5.3  52.6  6.0 n.a.  (1.0)  (1-4)  (1.7)  (I. 1)  (0.6)
PTA  1987  n.a.  n.a.  56.1  8.4  51.7  9.4  47.8  8.9  37.9  7.0  50.2  8.5 n.a.  (1.1)  (0.5)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.2)
For definition  of RI  schemes,  see appendix  table  Al.
a.  Year the  arrangement  went into  effect  if different  from year of foundation.  Ratios  refer  to number  of members  in year of calculation  [e.g. EC (6) in 1970,  EC  (9) in 19751.
b.  Openness measured by the trade/GDP ratio.
c.  Intra-regional trade measured by share of intra-regional exports in total exports (share of RI scheme in total world exports in parenthesis). Souirce: IMF Direclion of trade.
15the only developing-country  grouping that sustained  an increase in intra-regional  trade while also
increasing its share in world exports. Jn  the case of CACM, unlike other developing-arrangements,
an across-the-board  approach to trade liberalization  was carried out.  This is the approach that was
adopted among  developed-country  arrangements. Avoiding the product-by-product  approach typical
of other developing  country schemes  avoided the decline in trade with the outside world and also
helped promote internal trade, confirming  the practical wisdom of GAIT article XXIV which requires
countries  forming an FTA or a CU to substantially  liberalize  all trade flows. 9
Insofar as one of the main goals of the early RI schemes  among developing  countries was to
industrialize  by increasing intra-regional  trade, it is clear that the goal was not achieved. There are
many reasons for this -- including  those relating to their relatively rigid trade and production
structures -- but one major reason was implementation  failure.
IL. The Welfare Economics  of Preferential  Trading Arrangements' 1
1.  Efriciency  Implications
The figures in table 4 show a large increase in trade for the EC and EFTA following integration
and little increase in intra-regional  trade for developing-country  RI schemes. Above, we attributed
these differences  to implementation. But there are other reasons as well.  Consider the standard
analysis  of an FTA.  Figures 1 and 2 show the general equilibrium  import-demand  and export-supply
9  This point made in Wonnacott  and Lutz (1988, p. 77).  Also note that ASEAN adopted a
product-by-product  approach. The reason for the increase in openness of ASEAN countries is that
they simultaneously  liberalized  unilaterally. The sharp increase in trade among ASEAN partners was
due mostly  to sub-contracting.
'°  This section draws on de Melo, Panagariya  and Rodrik (1992).
16curves in the proverbial two-good,  three-country  model.  A and B are potential partners in an FTA
and C represents  the outside world.
Consider first the case representative  of many FTAs in developing countries  during the first
wave of RI. In that case both will export good 2 (coffee) and import good 1 (steel) from C and there
will be no trade between  them in the initial equilibrium. If the tariff on C remains unchanged, the
FTA will be vacuous (the same outcome would occur if B were the low cost supplier). This case
explains  why there has been so little increase in intra-regional  trade among developing  countries.
Consider now the efficiency  effects by allowing A and B to import different goods (A imports
good 1 and B exports it).  We are prinmarily  interested in the welfare of A and B.  A and B form an
FTA.  In figure 1, we illustrate  the constant  cost case, and in figure 2, the case of increasing costs in
the partner, B.  Start with the constant  costs case.  Assume  that initially A levies a uniform tariff at
rate tA  on imports from both B and C.  All imports come from C with gains from trade represented
by the area MHPC. Let A form an FTA with B.  Imports from B are freed of the duty while those
from C continue to be subject to the tariff at rate tA.  We have a "sudden  death" of imports from C
and all imports switch to B.  There are two analytically  separate effects:  A's terms of trade
deteriorate  and the distortion between the domestic and (new) border price disappears. The former
effect is harmful while the latter is beneficial. The net effect of the FTA on A is ambiguous. As
regards B and C, given constant costs, they neither gain nor lose.  This means that the welfare effects
of the FTA on the union as a whole, and on the world, move in the same direction as its effects on
A.
To see the effects on A, observe that the tariff revenue disappears  after the formation of the
FTA.  A part of this lost revenue is captured by A's consumers  via a lower domestic.  price of
imports; the remainder, represented  by area pb pl G K in Figure 1 pays for the inefficiency  of B and
is lost to A as well as to the world as a whole.  At the same time A makes a gain, represented  by
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18area GLN due to a contraction  of domestic output and an expansion  of consumption. The net effect
depends on the relative size of these two shaded areas. In terms of Viner's terminology,-the  FTA
just described is trade diverting (because  low cost imports  from C are replaced by imports from B).
Yet, the net effect of the FTA on welfare is ambiguous.
Figure 1 indicates  that an FTA is likely to raise efficiency: (i) the more elastic A's import
demand at the initial equilibrium,  L; (ii) the higher the initial tariff; and (iii) the  smaller the
difference  between costs in B and C.  If one applies  these conditions  to an evaluation  of the first wave
of RI schemes  when initial tariffs were high all-around, it is clear that a priori, one would expect
FTAs to raise (lower) efficiency  for developed (developing)  country schemes. This is so because of
relatively low import demand elasticities  in developing  countries  and relatively large differences in
cost structures with non-partner (developed  countries)  for developing countries.
Allow now for increasing costs in B."'  In figure 2, B's export-supply  curve is now
positively sloped. In the initial equilibrium,  both B and C are subject to the tariff t* and their supply
curves as perceived  by residents  of A are shown by dotted lines.  Total imports into A are DL of
which DK come from B and KL from C.  Introduction  of the FTA pushes B's export-supply  curve to
the solid line and its exports expand at the expense  of C.  There is no "sudden death" of imports from
C in this case.  The reason is that at C's tariff inclusive  price, B is unable to satisfy A's entire
demand. The result is no change in A's domestic  price and hence no efficiency improvement. At the
same time, tariff revenue on imports from B is lost.  A's welfare declines unambiguously.
A key point which emerges from Figure 2 is that a necessary  but not sufficient condition  for
an FTA to improve A's welfare is that it cause a "sudden  death" of imports from C.  This condition
is satisfied when the initial tariff is sufficiently  high to place C's tariff inclusive  price above point F in
"  This model was analyzed  originally  by Vanek (1965) and developed further by Kemp
(1969).
19Figure 2.  In this case, an FTA lowers the domestic price of importables  in A and generates positive
efficiency  effects.  These effects must be weighed  against the revenue lost from the FTA.  Welfare is
more likely to improve  under conditions  (i) to (iii) above.
What is the effect of the FTA on B's welfare? B's gains from trade are given by the area
above its export supply curve and below the selling price.  Initially, B receives the price P'  and sells
DK; its gains from trade are  p CHEF  . After the formation  of the FTA, it receives the price
(1 +tA)Pc  and sells DG; it gains from trade rise to  DGE B  . The FTA yields an unambiguous  gain to
B equal to  DGHP0 .
In the case depicted in figure 2, the union as a whole and the world are worse off after the
formation  of the FTA.  This is seen by the fact that A's loss, DGJPC,  is larger than B's gain,
DGHPC. Intuitively,  with no-change  in the price in A after the formation of FTA, there are no
efficiency  gains in that country. At the same time, the FTA encourages  inefficient  production in B.
Specifically,  the cost of imports HJ from B exceeds  the cost of obtaining the same imports  from C.
Overall efficiency  in A and B, and hence the world, declines." 2
Does this more realistic case -- in which there is no "sudden  death" of imports  from the C -
suggest  that an FTA is likely to reduce global efficiency? In an important  paper, Kemp and Wan
(1976) show in a standard  model, similar to the one developed above, that one can always design a
welfare improving  FTA.  This is because one can choose a common set of tariffs in such a way that
12  Figure 2 also sheds light on the relationship  between  the initial level of trade between partner
countries  and the welfare effects  on individual  countries. Ceteris paribus, the larger the proportion  of
A's trade coming from B initially, the greater the loss to A from the FTA.  Essentially,  the loss to A
is equal to the tariff revenue collected  on imports  from B which is larger the larger the imports from
B.  This observation  casts some doubt on the popular argument  that potential losses to Mexico  from
an FTA with the U.S.A. are small because much  of its trade is already with the U.S.A.  What the
larger initial volume of trade guarantees is smaller losses for the union as a whole and not for each
partner.
20the external  terms of trade (and hence the quantities  traded with the outside world) remain unchanged,
while internal trade is rearranged to maximize  the gains from the FTA.'3
Another important  qualification  to the results in figure 2 - and relevant to most first wave Rls
described in table 1 where tariff reduction among  partners was almost invariably  partial - is that a
preferential  trading arrangement  (PTA) is superior to a FTA.  The intuition  behind this typical second
best result due to Meade (1955)  - in a slightly augmented  model with three goods and symmetric
trade patterns - is that as tariffs are progressively  lowered  on partner imports, marginal  gains
decrease, while simultaneously  the wedge on imports from the non-partner  increase.  Hence a PTA
which does not eliminate  entirely  tariffs among  partners is superior to a FTA.  Should this result be
taken to suggest that first wave Rls among  developing  countries were efficiency  enhancing? Certainly
not since these FTAs were riddled with long exception  lists and compensation  mechanisms  that in
effect prevented inefficient  industries  from closing  down.
2.  Rationale for RI Integration
So far, in terms of efficiency, there is nothing in the previous analysis  of FTAs that would
suggest that a preferential arrangement  would be superior to UTL in which trade liberalization  is
extended to all trading paLrners. Yet, two reasons have often been advanced  in favor of RI:  market
access and economies  of scale.  We will examine  the problem of market access in the discussion  of
trading blocs below.  Now we discuss briefly why during the first wave of RI arrangements, many
economists  relied on the notion that FTAs and CUs as vehicles for the exploitation  of economies  of
scale. This emphasis is interesting, since scale economies  by themselves  do not provide a rationale
13  de Melo, Panagariya  and Rodrik (1992) extend this result to the relevant case of reductions in
QRs, so common  among developing  countries.
21for regional integration. What they do is to strengthen  the case for FTAs based on other reasons. 1'
The missing link is a non-economic  objective, in this case industrialization,  which was viewed as a
goal in much discussion  of the effects of integration  during the first wave of RI.  Cooper and Massell
(1965), showed  that if industrialization  is an objective, then economies  of scale does provid3 a
rationale  for RI over a UTL approach. Thus, if a case for regional integration  exists for other
reasons, as in the Cooper-Massell  case, scale economies  generally reinforce it.  This is perhaps the
reason why economies  of scale are cften a part of the case for FTAs and CUs.
Consider first the case of an import substitution  objective  involving  a target level of industrial
output which corresponds  to the "training grounds" argument advocated  by proponents of early RI
schemes  among developing  countries. Suppose  that both A and B have a target level of aggregate
import-competing  industrial output. Then the two countries  could benefit from an FTA which enables
them to specialize  within their industrial  sector according to their comparative  advantage  and keep
the level of industrial imports from C fixed.l.  The reason for this result follows from the Kemp-
Wan theorem and does not rely on economies  of scale.  If scale economies  are present, however, the
gains from specialization  are likely to be larger.  In the presence of scale economies, gains from
specialization  consist of larger rectangular  areas rather than conventional  triangular areas which tend
to be small.
Consider next the case when, due to tariffs and transport costs, the price at which A and B
can buy a good from C is higher than that at which they can sell the same good to the latter.  We
14  Under the standard small country assumption,  UTL is likely to dominate  FTAs even in the
presence of scale economies. Intuitively,  if the minimum  cost of production of a good along the long-
run average cost curve is below the world price, both potential partners in the FTA should produce
the good up to the minimum  cost point.  They should then consume  domestically  as much as is
demanded  at the world price and export the residual.  Goods for which minimum  cost is above the
world price should not be produced. Free trade will generally  ensure these outcomes.
15 See Cooper and Massel (1965b)  and Bhagwati (1968, 1990)  on this.
22now incorporate  declining  costs into this argument and show that gains from an FTA are likely to be
larger in this case.  Assume  perfect initial symmetry  between A and B.  Specifically,  they face the
same unit cost curve and demand for the commodity  under consideration. In Figure 3, taken from
Corden (1972), AB is the unit cost curve, DADA  is the demand in A and DA+BDA+D1B  is the horizontal
sum of demands  in A and B.  As drawn, DADA lies half way  between  the vertical axis and DA+BDA+B.
The price at which A and B can import the good from C, PM,  is higher than the price at which they
can export it to the latter, P1. The difference  between  PM  and P. is accounted  for by transportation
costs and tariffs levied by C.  In the initial equilibrium,  both A and B employ made-to-measure  tariffs
which raises the domestic price just enough to make domestic production competitive  with imports
from C.  In Figure 3, the tariff inclusive  price in the initial equilibrium  is given by PM+t.  Both
countries  produce the good in quantities  (OC) just enough to satisfy domestic demand.
Now consider a CU between A and B which eliminates  tariffs on intra-trade  and replaces the
old made-to-measure  tariff, t, by a union-wide  made-to-measure  tariff, tu.  Only one of the two
countries, say A, will produce the good in the post-union  equilibrium. Both production  costs and
consumer  price will decline to PM+tU. Each country  will expand consumption  from OC to OC' and
make a welfare gain equal to the shaded area enclosed  within the pre- and post-union  prices and the
demand curve.  Unlike the usual triangular gains under increasing costs, the FTA yields gains
comprising  a rectangle and a triangle.  These  gains can be further multiplied if there are many goods
subject  to scale economies. For example, if there are two goods subject to increasing  returns, each
partner can specialize in one of them and obtain the other from the partner at a lower cost.
23Figure  3 Economies  of  Scale
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24IV.  Bargaining, Trading Blocs, and Market Access
So far we have not considered  the possibility  that an FTA or a CU can raise the bargaining
power of the Union. The terms of trade of union members  depend not merely on their external
tariffs, but also on tariffs imposed  on them by the outside world.  To the extent that the level of these
tariffs can be influenced  through bargaining, an FTA which increases  the joint bargaining  power of
member countries can confer further gains on the latter.  Interestingly,  unlike the first type of gains,
these gains need not come at the expense  of the outside world.  The union as well as the outside
world may benefit from mutual tariff reduction.
Probably the existence  of the EC has helped Western European countries  to negotiate  better
i
deals with the U S. in bargaining  tariff reductions  than if they had dealt individually  with the U.S.
More recently, the restraint shown by the U.S. towards EC in using Super 301 threats is a direct
result of the EC's ability to inflict injury on the U.S. through retaliation. By contrast, the U.S. has
used this instrument  with relative ease against individual  countries  such as Japan, Brazil and India.
By contrast, economic  unions in Africa and Latin America were much too small relative to
their counterparts in the developed world (see table 4 above).  As a result, any expectations  of these
countries  regarding benefits from joint negotiations  with the U.S. and the EC were bound to result in
a disappointment. In the absence  of non-economic  objectives, UTL is not merely superior to an FTA
or a CU but it actually enables a country to attain the maximum  income  possible.  This fact has led
several authors to argue that an FTA or a CU offers nothing to a small country that it cannot achieve
on its own through UTL. 16 An obvious implication  of this argument for many small economies in
16  For example,  see Cooper and 1.1assell  (1965), Johnson (1965), Berglas (1979) and Robson
(1980). Additional references can be found in Wonnacott  and Wonnacott  (1981).
25Africa, Asia, and Latin America is that they are better off liberalizing  trade unilaterally  rather than
engaging  in regional arrangements.
The UTL argument is undoubtedly  powerful. But suppose  that the developed and newly
industrialized  countries are divided into three blocs: North America, Western
Europe and East Asia.  Also suppose  that each one of these blocs allows free internal  trade but
imposes  high duties or voluntary  export restraints on extra-bloc  imports.  Under these circumstances,
will developing  countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America benefit more from UTL or from joining
one of the blocs? Common  sense dictates  that the latter option is likely to be welfare superior since it
guarantees market access, though it involves  adopting  and maintaining  the bloc's barriers to trade
with extra-bloc countries.
Wonnacott  and Wonnacott  (1981) recognize  that the conventional  literature on FTAs fails to
take into account transport costs and trade restrictions imposed  by partner countries and, more
importantly,  by the outside world.  Once these restrictions  are taken into account, it is entirely
possible for an FTA to be superior to UTL.  In the above example  of trading blocs, UTL may fail to
give a country access to the markets  of any of the blocs.  Accession  to a bloc may solve this market
access  problem.
This raises the question  of the pros and cons of a world divided into trading blocs.  In the
introduction,  it was suggested  that such a division  offers advantages  and disadvantages. Advantages
insofar as it helps solve the free-rider problem and difficulties  that of multilateral  negotiations  when
the number  of participants is large.  Disadvantages  insofar as a few large trade blocs may get caught
into a prisoners' dilemma  problem. While it would be preferable  for all to cooperate, individually,
each bloc is likely to take on a selfish attitude and impose  restrictions.
The implications  of a non-cooperative  trade strategy were frst  explored by Krugman (1991),
and, more recently, by Deardorff and Stern (1991) and Srinivasan  (forthcoming). Krugman employs
26a one-product  monopolistic  competition  model in which the world consists of a large number of
identical  countries. Each country produces one variety of the product and, behaving as a Nash
player, imposes the optimum tariff on imports from all other countries. At one extreme, in the
absence of blocs, there being a large number  of countries, the optimum  tariff is 0 and the global
optimum is reached.  As blocs are created, starting from a large number of small identical blocs,
tariffs become positive and welfare declines. As blocs become larger, the optimum tariff on extra-
bloc countries  rises.  There is a trade creation and a trade diversion effect.  The former results from
expansion  of trade among within-bloc  countries while the latter follows from increased tariff on extra-
bloc trade.  The net effect of increasing  the bloc size and reducing the total number of blocs depends
on whether the trade creation effect dominates the trade diversion effect.  Using simulations,
Krugman  finds that the net effect is negative  until the number of blocs declines to 3.  After that, the
net effect becomes positive with welfare rising to the global maximum  when the world becomes a
single  bloc, which represents  the other extreme.
Krugman (forthcoming)  goes on to show that as long as the assumed symmetry  in his model
is maintained, the result that the division  of the world into a small number  of blocs minimizes  welfare
is robust.  For example, if the tariff rate on extra-bloc imports is held fixed or is chosen according  to
a more realistic model of tariff formation, the welfare minimizing  number of blocs remains 2 or 3.
Deardorff and Stern (1991) take issue with Krugman  and argue that his assumptions  of a
single product which precludes inter-industry  trade entirely and of symmetry  everywhere are crucial
to the result he derives.  Deardorff and Stern then provide alternative  models in which a small
number  of blocs can in fact maximize  welfare.  In these models, countries  are differentiated  by factor
endowments. For example, suppose  there are half as many types of countries as the total number  of
countries. Then, if the world is divided into two identical blocs such that each block has exactly one
economy  of every type, gains from trade will be maximized  without any inter-bloc  trade.
27Srinivasan  (forthcoming)  also criticizes Krugman's model, describing it as "theory without
relevance"  and offers a Ricardian  model of blocs with two-commodities,  one factor, and a continuum
of countries. The factor is called labor and goods are denoted 1 and 2.  The labor to output ratio is 1
for good 1 and "a" for good 2.  Coefficient  a is a variable which also serves to index countries.
Specifically,  a is distributed  uniformly over the interval (1-b, 1  +b) where b is a fixed, known number
such that  Ocb<l.  Countries  in the interval 1-bsas1  have the labor endowment  r;(a)  =a
while countries in the interval  12 a 21 +b  have  L (a)  = 1.  This is shown in Figure 4a.
For countries  in the interval (1-b, 1), the labor endowment  being a, the maximum  possible
quantity  of good 1 is a and that of good 2 is 1.  (Recall  that the labor-to-output  ratio is 1 for good 1
and . for good 2.)  Thus, production frontiers  of these countries  pivot around point A2 in Figure 4b
with the outermost  curve corcesponding  to the country with a =  1 and the innermost  one
corresponding  to a =  I-b.  Analogously,  for countries in the interval (1, 1  +b), the labor endowment
being 1, the maximum  possible quantity of good 1 is 1 and that of good 2 is 1/a.  Production
frontiers of these countries  will pivot around point A,, in Figure 4b with the outermost curve
corresponding  to a =  1 and innermost  one to a =  1  +b.
Assuming  identical Cobb-Douglas  preferences  which give equal weight to the two goods, it is
easy to see from Figure 4b that the free trade price of good 2 (in teims of good 1) will be 1 with all
countries  consuming  at point C. countries  in the interval  1 -b s a <  1  specializing  in good 2,
countries  in the interval  1+bka>-1  specializing  in good 1, and the country with a =  I
diversifying.
Now suppose we form two blocs:  one consisting  of countries with the two innermost
production  frontiers and one with all the other countries. It is easy to see that within each bloc, the
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- SS.~*,  29price will remain I and welfare will reach the global maximum  without any interbloc  trade.  We can
also choose four, six, eight, etc. of the innermost  countries  to form one bloc and the resf to form the
other bloc.  The outcome will not change. Alternatively,  suppose  we form one bloc with all countries
whose production  frontiers pivot around A 2 (1-b&as1)  and the other bloc with countries whose
frontiers  pivot around Al.  It is clear that in this case bloc formation will lead to a loss of welfare.
Can we relate the number of blocs to welfare? Not really.  We have already seen that in each
of the two cases above, the number  of blocs was 2.  Yet, blocs in the first case were benign while in
the second case they were damaging. More concretely, in the first case, we can create as many blocs
as we want without affecting  welfare. Thus, we can make one bloc of countries  with two innermost
frontiers, a second one of two countries  with next to the innermost frontiers, and so on.
Where does this take us?  The implication  is that theory does not provide us with clear
guidelines. More importantlX,  in the end, the critical question  is whether blocs, once they have been
formed, will cooperate  or be hostile. In dynamic  terms, even if the initial division  of the world into a
given set of blocs is welfare worsening, it may be desirable if it leads to eventual freeing of the world
trade.  A priori, as the number of players becomes  small, a cooperative  solution is more likely -
though individual  players will also fare better if bargaining fails.  There does not appear to be a clear
consensus  here.  One view is that negotiations  among  a few players will be easier and free-rider
problems  less than among 150 or more participants. The opposing  view is that bigger blocs will have
more monopoly  power and will be therefore more tempted  to erect trade barriers.
V.  An Evaluation of RI Arrangements
Where are the gains from RI likely to come from? In the review of the welfare economics  of
preferential trading arrangements, we concentrated  on static efficiency  effects and did not refer to the
30"dynamic' effects that many have argued to be important  [e.g. Balassa (1961)], even though they are
difficult  to quantify. Also, like scale efficiency  effects, they are not particular to RI arraingements.
However, these effects are likely to be more important  than the static efficiency  effects alluded in
sections  m and IV.  For example, if increased competition  from trade puts pressures on domestic
firms to adopt new technologies  at a faster rate than in an environment  sheltered from competition.
An enlarged market also increases  the stimulus  to investment  to take advantage  of the enlarged market
and to meet the expanding  competition. As has been emphasized  in the new growth literature, one
would expect a catch-up  to occur on the part of the least-developed  partners.  However, in past RI
schemes  among developing countries  this dynamic  effect was probably  not fully exploited  because  of
frequent barriers to the purchase  of foreign technology.
Economic  cooperation  in areas where significant  externalities  and public goods (education,
research and development, infrastructure,  environment)  exist, is also a potentially important  area for
dynamic  benefits. The potential benefits of cooperation  have been emphasized  by Langhammer  and
Heimenz (1990, 1991) and Foroutan (forthcoming). Cooperation  can take many different forms
ranging  from the simple exchange  of information  through the provision of joint training facilities  to
the mutual recognition  and adaption of rules and regulations, to the implementation  of joint policies
and the establishment  of joint institutions  with quasi-legislative  powers. In the sample of schemes
described in table 1, only ASEAN and SADCC emphasized  cooperation.
Can one discern any of these "dynamic"  effects? To do so would require in-depth micro-level
information,  extending  beyond this paper.  Less ambitiously,  we examine GDP and investment  data
for the group of regional arrangements  identified  in table 1 to see if there were any apparent changes
in the value of these variables following  integration.  While we are aware that any observed changes  is
also likely to capture a host of other effects, one would hope that if integration  changed  the climate
31among  members, other things equal, one would observe at the aggregate  level some stimulus either
via increased investment  or through higher growth among members.
Growth Effects
Higher growth was among  the ultimate objectives  of all integration  arrangements."'
Was there any discemible effect of integration  on growth and investment? Table 5 compares decadal
rates of growth for a sample 101 countries. The sample is divided into 23 OECD developed countries
and 78 developing  countries. The cut off point for the sample is somewhat  arbitrary, but it was
chosen so that all members of EFTA and EEC (12) would fit in the developed-country  sample during
the entire 1950-88  period.  In a first pass, we report in table 5 average growth rates and investment
rates for the RI schemes  described in section II for the periods 1950-9, 1960-72  and 1973-88. We
compare them with the average growth rate for the entire sample of developed and  developing
countries'". The breakdown  into these three periods is convenient  as it corresponds  quite well to the
dates when the RI arrangements  were implemented.
Three results stand out from table 5.  First, among  the developed country schemes, there was
a sharp increase in investment  among EFTA and EC during the decades of the sixties while
integration  was taking place. Can this be attributed  to the positive effects of integration?  This is
difficult to ascertain  since the average figures for the sample also show an increase for this period. It
is, however, interesting  to look at the evolution  of the investment  ratio for the EC in figure 5 in
comparison  to all other developing  countries (including  EFTA). It is clear from that graph that there
''  Other objectives  such as diluting political frictions were also important  as for instance in
the case of ASEAN.
.s  The use of decadal (or more) average growth rates helps control for the role of exogenous
sporadic  factors that affect growth like shocks. See Easterly et al. (1992).
32Table S:  Growth and Investment Among RI Schemes
Period  1950-60  1960-72  1973-85
Variable  GDP  INV  GDP  INV  GDP  INV
EC (1960)  3.3  25.1  3.7  28.1  1.5  23.5
(1.8)  (0.7)  (0.6)
EFTA (1960)  3.4  25.8  3.7  29.9  2.3  28.1
(1.4)  (0.6)  (0.9)
CACM (1960)  1.8  10.6  2.5  11.8  -5.0  13.1
(1.4)  (0.6)  (1.6)
LAFTA (1960)  1.5  16.2  2.8  15.0  0.4  16.8
(1.6)  (1.7)  (1.5)
CEAO (1974)  N.A.  N.A.  1.0  6.8  0.0  8.6
N.A.  N.A.  (2.2)  (0.9)
ANDEAN (1969)  1.6  20.1  2.7  18.3  0.5  19.0
(1.8)  (0.4)  (1.5)
UDEAC (1973)  N.A.  N.A.  2.2  15.9  1.4  18.3
N.A.  N.A.  (2.5)  (3.0)
All Developed  3.4  22.1  4.1  26.6  1.7  25.2
(23 Countries)  (1.8)  (1.6)  (0.8)
All Developing  1.8  16.3  2.8  15.8  0.9  17.7
(78 Countries)  (1.6)  (2.2)  (3.0)
Sourc:  Heston and Summers  (1991).
Notes:  GDP  =  real GDP growth; INV  =  real investment  real GDP.
N.A. = Not available;  Geometric  averages; standard deviation  in parenthesis.
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34was a sharp take-off in investment  for the EC(6) just after the signing of the treaty for the European
Coal and Steel Community  (1952), also the time when it was decided to go ahead with the Treaty of
Rome (1957)  that established  the EC. (Between  1960 and 1968 all QRs and tariffs were eliminated  on
irntra-EC  trade.) 19
Second, there was a sharp decline in the standard  deviation in GDP growth rates among the
EC and EFTA.  This decline did not occur for the remaining  developed countries. This reduction in
the variance  of growth rates is not direct evidence  of success of RI.  However, insofar as integration
speeds up the adoption of new technologies  and increases  the mobility of factors, one would expect
more open economies  to have greater rates of convergence.' One would also expect that
convergence  would be speeded  up among countries  that integrate if the poorer countries with less
flexible economic  structures and less well-developed  policy instruments,  acquire macroeconomic
stability  and "institutions"  through membership. 2'
Third, among developing  countries, one observes  no change in investment  or growth rates
following  integration. The only schemes where investment  rose following  integration  (CEAO and
UDEAC)  experienced  a fall in growth. One should not, however, attribute the decline in growth to a
fall in the efficiency  of investment  associated  with integration  since there was a fall in growth
everywhere  following  the supply-side  shocks  that started in 1973.
19  The discussion  below, however, suggests  countries that during the 1960s  investment  ratios
were even higher among EFTA countries. It is interesting  that a similar announcement  effect seems
to have occurred in Mexico, the country  that would gain the most from NAFTA. Shortly following
the announcement  of NAFTA, investment  rose sharply in Mexico, the country that would gain the
most from a NAFTA.  (Also U.S. FDI into Mexico was 50% higher in 1991 than in 1990.)
20 Ben-David  (1991) interprets the declining  variance  in growth rates across EC countries during
1960-72  as evidence  of the catch-up effects  of opening-up. While this may be the case, he does not
point out that a similar decline in variance  occurred among  EFTA countries.
21  de Melo, Panagariya and Rodrik (forthcoming)  develop a model in which integration  allows
the government  to carry out more efficiently  its policy objectives  as it dilutes the power of lobbies.
35As a prelude to the estimation  of a cross-country  growth equation, we looked for evidence  of
differences  in growth rates zrnong  countries that integrated  for the periods 1960-72  and 1973-85. The
test is for a difference  in mean growth rates for countries  that integrated compared with those that did
not in each grouping (developed  and developing). As expected,  in no case was GDP growth
statistically  different from the mean of the respective  comparator  group.  Next, we added investment
as an explanatory  variable to the growth equation. Within the developing-country  grouping, none of
the dummy variables controlling  for RI membership  was significant  (either individually  or jointly).
On the other hand, within the developed-country  grouping, for the period 1960-72, the investmnent
rate was significantly  higher than the mean for EFTA (also for the EC but not significantly  so).  Thus
within the OECD group, EFTA, and to a lesser extent, the EC had higher investment  rates than the
comparator  group that did not integrate. While these results are consistent  with the dynamic effects
of integration  mentioned  above. it could have reflected other factors as well, including  reconstruction
from the war.
In a last step, we fitted a growth equation  to the cross-section  to the sample of countries as in
table 5. The model is then used to test for the eventual  influence  of belonging  to an RI scheme by
including  dummy variables for membership. The model is estimated  over the two sub-periods 1960-
72 and 1973-85." Splitting  of the sample into two sub-periods  was necessary to test for AI
membership. The breakpoint  was also done to correspond to the first oil shock.  As to the splitting of
aie sample into a developed  and a developing  country  grouping, the Chow test strongly supported the
split for the first subperiod, but only marginally for the second subperiod. Because  heteroskedasticity
could  be important  across countries, the standard errors for the coefficients  are based on White's
(1980)  heteroskedasticity-consistent  covariance  matrix.  Besides  investment, the explanatory  variables
2  The theoretical  basis for a growth model where investment  is the only factor affecting  long-
run growth must rely on the assumption  that capital is the only scarce factor of production. Faini, de
Melo, Senhadji  and Stanton (1992) argue that this is plausible  for developing countries.
36include initial per capita income and a proxy for human capital.  The human capital variable is an
index of the average schooling  of the population  over 25 years old at the beginning of each sample
period (1960 and 1975). It is taken from Barro and Lee (1992) and is superior to the usual primary
and secondary  enrollment  ratios, which do not proxy for the stock of human capital.
It is expected  that poor countiies will grow faster because of a higher marginal  product of
capital in poor countries, so the expected  sign of initial income is expected  to be negative. On the
other hand, it is expected  that the proxy for human capital will enter with a positive sign.'
The results are reported in tables 6 and 7.  We test for the effects of RI by including  dummy
variables for the following  arrangements  (years of implementation  in parenthesis): (i) arnnng
developed countries, EC (1960) and EFTA (1960); (ii) among  developing  countries CACM (1960),
LAFTA (1960), SACU (1969), Andean (1969), UDEAC (1973) and CEAO (1974).  Among  the
latter group, SACU (Botswana,  Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland)  is an example  of a North-South
RI scheme and CEAO which includes former French colonies are also part of a monetary union since
they are all members  of the CFA zone.'
The overall fit of the model is satisfactory  and similar to those obtained by other cross-
country  growth exercises [e.g. Barro (1991)]. Note, however, that even though all the explanatory
variables  have the expected  signs, the overall fit is much poorer for the developed-country  sample
during the second period.  Undoubtedly,  this reflects a combination  of omitted-variable  bias,
misspecification  and endogeneity  of regressors (see below) as well as the lack of variables capturing
the effects of the supply-side  shocks starting in 1973.
2  We also tested for the importance  of economies  of scale by including as a proxy for market
size the initial level on industrial  output.  As expected  this variable is highly correlated with income
so that, when entered together, they lose their significance.
I'  Other RI schemes  that were not included  either did not have a long enough existence  (e.g.
SADC, Canada-U.S. FTA, etc.) or did not achieve  much by way of integration.
37TABLE 6. Cross Country Growth (Developed and Developing)
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE: GR6072
N of OBS  23  23  23  23  78  78  78  78  78  78
Const.  24.486  24.194  22.767  19.947  5.941  5.457  5.942  6.001  6.372  5.944
3.85-  3.97--  3.50"*  3.47--  2.94--  2.59--  2.97**  2.98-^  3.12--  2.83--
LGOP60  -2.806  -2.759  -2.612  -2.255  -0.768  -0.703  -0.771  -0.778  -0.795  -0.747
-3.16-*  -3.26-  *  -2.96- *  -2.98^*  -2.58^ *  -2.25* *  -2.61 * *  -2.62-  *  -2.64"-  -2.83"
A160  0.099  0.099  0.115  0.134  0.095  0.093  0.096  0.096  0.086  0.088
2.06'  2.07-  2.25*  2.61  - *  2.89^ *  2.92" *  2.88" *  2.85"*  2.64"*  2.59*"
BAR60  0.101  0.097  0.070  0.023  0.259  0.245  0.257  0.252  0.252  0.230
0.565  0.550  0.403  0.147  2.36'  2.30'  2.34*  2.17'  2.35*  2.05'
EEC9  -0.230  -0.639
-0.725  -1.443
EFTA  .-0.41  1  -0.891
-1-.153  -1.656
SACU  1.654  1.607
2.23*  2.22'
CACM  0.200  0.199
0.584  0.502
LAFTA  0.152  0.188
0.249  0.293
CEAO  -1.626  -1.501
-1.96'  -1.781
R2  0.667  0.672  0.676  0.698  0.288  0.315  0.288  0.288  0.312  0.338
MSE  1.042  1.064  1.057  1.050  1.903  1.879  1.915  1.915  1.883  1.886
Notes:
GR6072  = Average rate of growth of the income pec capita for the 1960-1972 period (S & H).
LGDP60  = Logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1960 (S & H).
A160  = Average investment as a share of GDP 1960-1 972 (S & H).
BAR60  = Barro and Lee (1992) average schooling of the population over 25 years old in 1960.
EEC,  EFTA.  SACU. CACM, LAFTA, CEAO  = dummy variables for each one of the respective integration schemes
*  t-test significant at the 5% level.
t-test significant at the 1  % level.
38TABLE 7. Cross Country Growth (Developed and Developing)
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE. GR7385
N of OBS.  23  23  23  23  78  78  78  78  78  .78  78  78
Const.  1.643  2.712  5.888  5.781  11.797  11.621  11.685  11.895  11.786  11.760  11.711  11.502
0.230  0.371  0.812  0.783  2.38-  2.32-  2.30-  2.30-  2.36-  2.33-  2.37*  2.15'
LGDP73  -2.991  -0.340  -0.728  -0.700  -1.966  -1.935  -1.938  -1.984  -1.965  -1.959  -1.975  -1.937
-0.336  -0.368  -0.799  -0.746  -2.50'  -2.43^  -2.38*  -2.40^  -2.49*  -2.45'  -2.51 *  -2.23-
A173  0.083  0.069  -0.047  0.047  0.132  0.127  0.129  0.133  0.132  0.132  0.135  0.130
2.26-  1.88'  1.367  1.376  3.26-^  3.13--  3.02--  3.07^  3.22^-  3.24-"  3.32--  2.68*
BAR75  0.076  0.058  0.116  0.107  0.381  0.380  0.380  0.376  0.381  0.381  0.396  0.391
0.572  0.406  0.838  0.758  2.25  2  2.25  2.23-  2.30-  2.22'  2.26*  2.23'  2.34'
EEC12  -0.388  -0.101
-1.335  -0.336
EFrA  0.727  0.661
2.11  1.797
SACU  0.774  0.786
0.598  0.603
CACM  -0.512  -0.397
-0.623  *  -0.424
LAFrA  0.175  0.257
0.232  0.323
CEAO  0.043  0.148
0.068  0.213
ANDEAN  -0.167  -0.250
-0.242  -0.381
UDEAC  1.619  1.626
0.869  0.851
R2  0.182  0.228  0.290  0.293  0.212  0.216  0.214  0.212  0.212  0.212  0.219  0.224
MSE  0.818  0.816  0.734  0.805  2.698  2.711  2.713  2.716  2.716  2.716  2.704  2.792
Notes:
GR7385  = Average  rate of growth of the income  per capita for the 1973-1985 period (S & H).
LGDP73  = Logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1973  (S & H).
A173  =  Average  investment as a share of GDP 1973-1985 (S & H).
BAR75  = Barro and Lee (1992) average schooling  of the population over 25 years old in 1975.
EEC,  EFrA. SAClf. CACM, LAFTA. CEAO = dummy variables for each one of the respective integration schemes.
t-test significant at the 5% level.
t-test significant at the 1% level.
39With respect to RI membership,  three results stand out.  First, with the exception  to be
discussed below, none of the integration  dummies is significant. Insofar as splitting the sample
controls for some of the effects of omitted  variables, it is instructive  to note that belonging  to an RI
has no apparent effect on long-run growth. Of course, it could be argued that some of the regressors
are correlated  with the dummy  variable controlling  for RI membership  - for example  the investment
share in GDP could be higher among RI countries  because of the positive effect of membership  on
the macro and institutional  environment. Still, there is apparently  no effect of membership,  even for
developed  countries. To some extent this should not come as a surprise since trade liberalization  was
being carried out multilaterally  and benefits were therefore being spread out fairly evenly.  Thus there
is no apparent effect of membership  in terms of higher growth even for EC, EFTA and CACM
during the 1960s  when intra-regional  trade was growing rapidly.
Second, splitting the sample into developed  and developing  country groups reveals an
interesting  difference  in the role of human capital in explaining  growth.  Human capital is always
significant  for the developing-country  grouping, but not for the developed-country  group.  First, as
emphasized  by the "new" growth literature, human capital is a contributing  factor to growth for poor
countries. Second, as emphasized  in the institutional  analysis, and in the literature emphasizing
cooperation,  there would appear to be benefits from institution-building  and joint training.  This
aspect of integration, largely neglected  during the first wave of RI arrangements,  would appear to
promise benefits. Also note that the dummy  variable for SACU is significant  for the period 1960-72.
While not much can be read into this result because  of the particular role of South Africa and the fact
that SACU has been in existence  since 1910, it is worthwhile  to note that, along with SADCC (not
included here) and ASEAN, this is one of the few RI arrangements  that emphasized  cooperation.
Third, there is support to the wconvergence"  hypothesis  suggested by neoclassical  growth
theory, especially  during the first subperiod, and for the developing-country  grouping.  Initial income
40per capita always enters with a statistically  significant  negative  sign.  Other things equal, low-income
countries  tend to grow faster.  The new wave of RI often includes  the association  of more-developed
partners with less-developed  ones.  Insofar as RI speeds  up the transmission  of knowledge  and
technology  transmission  beyond that obtained via UTL, then regionalism  will increase catching-up.
VI.  Conclusions
Is the second wave of RI likely to encounter  the same difficulties  as the first wave? In a
forward-looking  evaluation,  one must ask oneself if today's conditions  would lead to the same
difficulties  in implementation. For several reasons, this is not likely to be so.  First, with the
exception  of some  African  RI schemes where conditions  do not seem to have changed much,
developing  countries involved  in RI schemes have recently independently  undertaken substantial  UTL.
This should make it easier to secure, if necessary  through a political bargaining process with lobbying
interest groups, the required additional  liberalization  for success. Second, objectives  have changed as
today virtually all new initiatives  are no longer looking  for "training  grounds", nor do they have as
their primary objective, ISI.  As we saw earlier, to be efficient  in developing  countries, RI calls for
substantial  specialization  to exploit economies  of scale. In turn, this specialization  requires adjustment
assistance  and therefore compensation  across members. Devising equitable  schemes  to allocate
industries  efficiently  turned out to be impossible  to achieve  among  developing  countries during the
first wave of RI.  Compensation  was only effectively  carried out during the Southern enlargement  of
the EC.  Insofar as there is a move towards North-South  RI arrangements,  the issue of compensation
may be less of a problem than previously.
Does this mean that the new wave of RI is going to be successful? Not necessarily, as some
new arrangements  (e.g. Canada-U.S. and Israel-U.S. FTAs) have so many exceptions  to effective
41trade liberalization  as to make the agreements  vacuous. These agreements  initiated by the smaller
trading partner reflect the desire of market access to the larger country, in reaction to their fear that
the world trading system will turn into trading blocs.  The danger for the smaller countries is that the
price they may have to pay to obtain market access in the form of exclusionary  agreements  (e.g.
Mexico  on autos with the U.S.) will result in the loss of foreign direct investment  from third
countries.
Where do we stand? Are RI schemes  a stepping  stone towards more integrated  world markets
or a distraction, and perhaps a hindrance, to the multilateral  reductions  in trade barriers? The
discussion  in section IV suggested  that the emergence  of trading blocs could turn out to be a help or a
hindrance depending  on whether  blocs would  be tempted to use their power and become inward-
looking. In this context, the GATT should strengthen  articles VI and XIX to make it more difficult
for trade policy to be dominated  by fair trade mechanisms  like Antidumping  actions and Voluntary
Export Restraints. And article XXV  which regulates the formation  of RI should require that external
barriers come down as CUs or FIAs are formed.  At the same time, the threats to a liberal integration
process will be limited if RI arrangements  eschew interim exceptions,  adopt liberal rules of origin,
and resist imposing  entry limitations.
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